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ABSTRACT 
This article presents a critique of recent policy discussions about the decentralisation of social programs in Canada, arguing that such 
discussions neglect the impact of decentralisation on poor women and children in particular. The paper goes on to advocate a form 
of social corporatism or "social partners"~with women as a key constituency to set standards for federal and provincial programs. 
RESUME 
Cet article presente une critique des discussions sur les politiques rdcentes en faveur de la decentralisation des programmes sociaux 
au Canada, qui soutiennent que ce genre de discussions negligent l'impact que la decentralisation a sur les femmes et sur les enfants 
pauvres en particulier. Cet expos6 se poursuit en recommandant une forme de corporatisme social ou "partenaires sociaux" — avec 
les femmes comme composantes importantes pour 6tablir des normes des programmes tede>aux et provinciaux. 
My country is not a country, it is ten provinces... 
A critical assessment o f the current 
proposals for decentralization o f control over 
social programs is urgently needed in light o f the 
First Ministers' conference o f the summer o f 1996, 
and the attention paid to policy proposals 
advocating a radical decentralization o f the 
federation. 1 Voices preaching disentanglement o f 
federal and provincial responsibilities, greater 
decentralization o f the design and delivery o f 
programs, and the end to federal transfers and 
federal meddling, are becoming louder. 2 A t the 
same time, these advocates usually call for internal 
trade barriers and barriers to the mobili ty o f people 
to be brought down. M a k i n g people "free to 
move," replacing a social union with an economic 
one, they argue, w i l l best provide for the economic 
well-being o f citizens o f this country. Some would 
go further, saying provinces should not have to 
adhere to any rules regarding social programs at 
a l l , but only to "national guidelines" (Greenspon 
and L a g h i , 1996). 
The debate in policy circles and in the 
media appears to accept the inevitability o f 
decentralization (Courchene, 1996a; Taylor, 1996): 
all that needs to be decided is i f it w i l l be moderate 
or more radical in scope. These propositions, this 
article argues, should not be accepted without 
scrutiny, especially not without considering the 
impact on the constituencies these programs are 
meant to serve and who are traditionally left out o f 
the debate: the poor, and in particular, poor 
women and children. 3 What is also striking about 
the debate and discussion surrounding 
decentralization is the lack o f critical reflection o f 
what radical decentralization means and whether 
alternatives exist to outright decentralization. It is 
time to bring these issues and concerns back into 
the debate. 
The question o f who w i l l regulate, and 
who should regulate, in an era o f straightened 
economic circumstances is an important one. The 
provinces have argued that since the federal 
government has substantially decreased funding, 
notably with the introduction o f the Canada 
Health and Social Transfer ( C H S T ) , it should no 
longer be able to put the same conditions on 
spending those monies. Premiers have contested 
the efforts o f Ottawa to reduce financial support 
for social programs while still continuing to police 
them. A l l provinces are demanding that they must 
have more authority to spend funds as they see fit 
in order to deal with the federal cutbacks. 
A t the same time, decentralization is seen 
as a means to demonstrate the workability o f 
federalism to Quebeckers. The suggestion, then, is 
to replace cooperative federalism and federal 
government "policing" with executive 
interprovincialism (Dupre, 1985). If the federal 
government is no longer providing the same level 
o f funding, and is hesitant to use its spending 
power any further, then, the radical decentralists 
propose, it should vacate the field entirely. 
Supporters o f decentralization suggest we move 
not just to perforated sovereignty, but to pure 
sovereignty for the provinces, with some powers 
delegated up to the federal government. This 
connotes a radical shift from a "federation" to a 
"confederation." 
H o w does this debate relate to feminism 
and women's concerns? Feminist scholars have 
long argued that the traditional welfare state poses 
numerous problems (Gordon, 1990; Sassoon, 
1992). Some have characterized the traditional 
welfare state as excessively regulatory, centralist, 
r ig id , and inflexible, with policies which often do 
not respond to the diversity of individuals and 
communities uti l izing these services (Howse, 
1995). 
However, the current push for 
decentralization o f social programs in Canada 
should not be considered a positive development 
for women. A s I w i l l argue, women are the losers 
in the current fight over the restructuring of the 
social safety net. First, cuts in transfer payments 
and consequent reductions in benefits have meant 
increases in poverty levels (Gadd, 1997; National 
Counc i l o f Welfare, 1997), particularly among 
women and children. Poverty is especially high 
among single mothers as wel l as among elderly 
women (Moore and Rosenberg, 1996), single 
women, and, as Jackman (1995) notes, aboriginal 
women and women with disabilities. In addition, 
women are heavily employed in the public sector, 
which is being reduced in an effort to save costs 
(Bakker, 1996). Moreover, governments have been 
slow to implement programs such as pay equity 
and employment equity which are designed to 
improve women's equality in the workforce. The 
Conservative government in Ontario, for example, 
has recently cancelled employment equity 
programs. Programs and services o f benefit to 
women are often the ideological and economic 
terrain for battle between governments, as the fight 
between Alberta and Ottawa over facilities fees, 
discussed below, reveals. 
Second, what is being pushed for is not 
simply a reconceptualization o f who should 
deliver programs, but whether any government 
should deliver these programs. Current suggestions 
to radically alter the terms o f federalism are also 
trying to reconceptualize the role o f the state or 
states ( if we conceive of provinces as states) and to 
privatize responsibility for social services. 
Some researches point to the inevitability 
o f these phenomena, suggesting an integrating 
global economy inevitably causes a splintering 
global polity (Courchene 1996b). Does this mean, 
then, that we should embrace the idea of radical 
decentralization of social programs, giving the 
provinces greater say in setting standards? What 
are the alternatives to decentralization? 
The current policy debate seems to 
suggest only two choices: continued involvement 
o f the federal government and lobbying for 
increased commitments, or radical decentralization 
to the provinces, with the federal government no 
longer giving money Gust tax points) and therefore 
also no longer imposing standards. In this article a 
third alternative is proposed: making the people 
who are consumers of the programs the enforcers 
o f standards. This article argues that both the 
debate and control over social programs should be 
removed from their territorial focus: that o f the 
provinces versus Ottawa. It suggests that new 
actors, representing constituency concerns — 
business, unions, social service associations, 
women's groups, as wel l as governments — should 
be the key decision makers and standard setters in 
social security. The article advocates a form o f 
social corporatism, or "social partners" to replace 
federal and provincial standard setters, with 
women as a key constituency to be included. 
P A S T P R A C T I C E 
The history of the welfare state in Canada 
is one o f the federal and provincial governments 
recognizing that many constituencies were 
neglected in the smattering o f provincial programs 
that had developed in the earlier part o f this 
century. I f one did not meet the criteria for a 
targeted social program, or did not fit the category 
o f "deserving," then one fell through the cracks, or 
had to rely on church or charitable groups 
(National Counc i l o f Welfare, 1995). Many 
assessments o f need were based on criteria 
damaging to women. I f a woman was divorced 
instead o f widowed, for example, her claim to 
entitlement changed. Pensions programs or 
allowances for sole-support mothers established by 
the western provinces and Ontario in the early part 
o f this century had very strict eligibil i ty criteria 
(Strong-Boag, 1979: 27). 
The inter-war period can also be 
characterized as a time o f decentralized welfare 
programs (Banting, 1987: 60). Several provinces 
had initiated social programs like Workers' 
Compensation legislation in Ontario and Mothers' 
Allowances. The only federal program that 
emerged in this period was a very limited and 
cost-shared old age pension scheme set up by 
Liberal Prime Minister Mackenzie K i n g in 1927." 
The federal government did not believe that it 
should assume a role in social security, even going 
so far as to relegate the care o f disabled veterans 
from W o r l d War I to private charity (Morton, 
1995). 
The changes initiated by the federal and 
provincial governments in the 1960s were 
designed not only to consolidate and nationalize 
programs, but also to take the arbitrariness out o f 
assessments o f need. It meant that for the first time 
a number o f previously neglected groups became 
eligible for social assistance and other services, 
and a number o f new programs for women and 
families, such as child care, were instituted. 
The development o f these joint programs 
also acknowledged that provinces could not pay 
for services on their own. A s Banting points out, 
programs l ike: 
Mothers' Allowances represented an 
unwelcome glimpse o f the future. The 
costs o f providing support for this 
relatively small group graphically 
highlighted the potential costs o f 
grappling with the full range o f income 
security needs emerging in Canadian 
society. A s a result, provincial 
governments were anxious to avoid 
welfare commitments, and continued to 
insist on municipal responsibility for 
relief efforts (Banting, 1987: 61-2). 
Provinces struggled to provide for even 
the piecemeal programs that were set up. Banting 
argues that the costs o f wholly-funded provincial 
programs such as Mothers' Allowances caught the 
provincial governments by surprise. "Expenditures 
greatly exceeded initial estimates, and rose 
dramatically throughout the 1920s, a fact which 
redoubled the reluctance o f poorer provinces to 
take the plunge and slowed the spread o f Mothers' 
Allowances in eastern Canada for almost a 
decade" (1987: 61). Under section 91 o f the 
Constitution Act, 1867, broad powers o f taxation 
to fund such programs, both then and now, lie with 
the federal government, not the provinces, so the 
provinces could not do much to raise revenues to 
provide these programs. 
Wor ld War II and the post-war period, in 
contrast, can be characterized as that o f a 
semi-centralized welfare state (Banting, 1987: 60). 
After the war, most Western industrialized 
governments acknowledged that more had to be 
done to prevent economies from returning to 
pre-war Depression conditions (Blake, 1995: 
246). In Canada, the federal government, first 
under Conservative Prime Minister R . B . Bennett, 
but primarily under Liberal Prime Minister 
Mackenzie K i n g , began to develop labour 
legislation based on the U . S . Wagner Act, and 
Keynsian-style full employment policies through 
the use of fiscal and monetary mechanisms. The 
federal government also introduced a grants 
program to equalize the programs offered by 
provincial governments throughout Canada. The 
federal Liberals successfully negotiated with the 
provinces to introduce federal unemployment 
insurance (UI) in 1940, after the Conservative 
government's Employment and Social Insurance 
Act, 1935 was found unconstitutional. 5 The federal 
Libera l government under Mackenzie K i n g 
introduced the Family Allowances Act in 1944 
under the authority o f the federal spending power. 
Implemented in 1945, it was the first universal 
social program in Canada. 6 
The federal government had also put 
forward proposals in 1945 to cost-share medical 
and hospital insurance and to take over 
responsibility for old age pensions; however it 
could not reach agreement with the provinces on 
revenue sharing (Blake and Keshen, 1995:4). It 
was not until the 1950s, then, that the federal 
government went ahead with some of its proposals 
and set up four categorical assistance programs in 
the 1950s for specific people in need. 7 Again , 
these programs were targeted, basing funding 
eligibility on the cause of need and thus continuing 
to demarcate between deserving and undeserving. 
The federal government also introduced health 
grants to the provinces in 1948, and aid to 
universities in 1952 (Pal , 1985: 9). 
The early 1960s marked the beginning of 
the universalization of Canadian social assistance 
programs and a movement away from the 
deserving/undeserving basis o f funding. This 
period o f government policy development can be 
considered state-driven as opposed to 
society-driven (Burt, 1990; Mahon, 1996: 19-20). 
The form these programs took was determined by 
federal government officials, in consultation with 
the provinces. 
In 1963, the federal government worked 
with the provinces to consolidate and expand the 
categorical programs, which led to the 
establishment o f the Canada Assistance Plan 
( C A P ) in 1966. The C A P was intended to expand 
social service delivery and to make it more 
efficient. 
Through the C A P , the federal government 
introduced cost sharing of a number o f welfare 
programs, including child care expenditures. It 
rolled in the categorical programs that were 
already in existence and extended funding to "all 
those in need or l ikely to be in need," thereby 
shifting the philosophical basis for assistance from 
the cause o f need to the fact o f need. The 
government also introduced a preventative aspect 
to the programs as it extended assistance not only 
to the poor but also to those who, save for 
government assistance, would become poor. 
Under the C A P , the federal government 
agreed to cost-share any new programs created by 
the provinces after 1965. It also agreed to 
cost-share the delivery o f new services including 
salaries (but not overhead). The provinces were 
sti l l responsible for the set up and operation o f 
services, as wel l as for eligibil i ty and spending 
levels. However, it became advantageous for the 
provinces to expand social services and to get 
involved in service delivery as no cei l ing existed 
on the amount o f federal government cost-sharing. 
For every dollar the provinces spent, the federal 
government wou ld contribute an equivalent 
amount. This system guaranteed the provinces 
long-term and automatic funding which required 
no negotiations. The open-ended funding system 
continued until 1990 when the federal government 
imposed a cap on C A P . 
The degree o f federal-provincial 
cooperation required to establish such a program, 
especially in the context o f Quebec sensitivities to 
federal intrusion into provincial welfare 
jurisdiction, makes a program like the C A P a 
remarkable accomplishment. In addition, federal 
government leadership as wel l as federal 
government funding was needed to get the national 
programs in place. This period thus marked an era 
o f cooperative federalism and federal government 
leadership that were crucial to getting national 
social programs established. 
The two institutional impetuses-
cooperative federalism and state-led social 
program development ~ did not connote a desire 
on the part o f governments to achieve equality for 
women. The effect o f such programs, though, was 
to improve the lives of women and children. 
Mahon argues that the government can be 
characterized as exhibiting "state feminism" during 
this period. This means, "the state acts to 
incorporate a definition o f women's concerns into 
policy without significant pressure or input from 
women's groups" (Mahon, 1996: 21). For example, 
monies for child care were agreed to as part o f the 
C A P , largely without the pressure o f a chi ld care 
lobby, which only developed in the late 1970s and 
1980s. Even the national chi ld care conferences, 
one in 1971 and the other in 1982, were sponsored 
by the federal Department o f Health and Welfare 
along with the Canadian Counc i l on Social 
Development. Women did not have a real say in 
how the programs were structured or developed, 
although women's groups and chi ld care advocacy 
groups d id begin to lobby for chi ld care programs 
that wou ld not be welfare focused. 
In 1971, the federal government agreed to 
introduce maternity benefits under the 
unemployment insurance program. Thus, the 
federal government can be credited with 
developing this program for women. A t the time, 
provinces were unwil l ing or unable to set up 
maternity benefits. The federal government 
decided to include maternity benefits under U I 
because it was a way for it to introduce a program 
that really fell under provincial jurisdiction. The 
program is placed under Unemployment Insurance 
for this reason, rather than because it is the best 
way to structure the program (Burt, 1990: 202-3). 
Thus many feminist scholars credit the 
federal government's activism in particular 
(Brodie, 1996: 8) and a general willingness on the 
part o f both levels o f government to cooperate 
(and to intervene in the economy and polity) for 
the expansion o f the Canadian welfare state and 
improvement o f benefits for women and children. 
Nonetheless, governments can be criticized for not 
involv ing women in the design and 
implementation o f these programs. 
Clear ly , too, there was a willingness on 
the part o f the provinces to enter these 
arrangements ~ recognition which is not made in 
the current decentralization debates. Had the 
"Fathers" o f Confederation foreseen the needs o f 
the 20th century and the welfare state that would 
develop when they were drafting the constitution, 
w o u l d they have been so quick to hand over full 
authority over social matters to the provinces? Or 
wou ld they have claimed those powers as matters 
o f national importance that could be most 
efficiently and effectively handled under federal 
jurisdict ion, or even shared jurisdiction, as they 
saw the need for shared jurisdiction in the areas of 
agriculture and immigration? 
Given as well the lack o f "Mothers" at the 
table, who may have had other ideas regarding the 
division of jurisdiction, can we adhere so r igidly to 
the division o f jurisdiction laid out in 1867? A 
flexible interpretation o f the original 1867 
arrangements was necessary, and acceptable, in 
order to establish a welfare state. W h y is that not 
possible now? 
T H E C U R R E N T I M P A S S E 
1) The change in fiscal relations 
It would appear, according to the rhetoric 
o f politicians at least, that a commitment to the 
welfare state remains strong. However, while the 
key actor o f the 1960s ~ the federal government — 
continues to declare its support for a strong social 
union, in practice it has little power and little 
poli t ical w i l l left to ensure it. 
One o f the keys to provincial willingness 
to cooperate with the federal government in the 
past in setting national standards was the promise 
o f federal monetary involvement. Cooperative 
federalism, then, and with it national standards, 
may no longer be a viable principle. In the past, a 
federal purse that specified what monies had to be 
spent on which services could force the 
recalcitrant provinces to spend where they may not 
have wanted to. Two conditions have pressured 
the federal government to move away from such a 
role: increasing federal deficits and the problem o f 
Quebec (Gibbins, 1996: 7). 
The federal government insists that it has 
run out o f cash. B y 1993 and the election o f the 
federal Liberal party, the federal deficit had 
reached $40.5 bi l l ion or approximately 7 per cent 
o f G D P , and the gross national debt was 
approximately 94 per cent o f G D P ( O E C D , 1995). 
Faced with a threatened credit downgrading by 
Moody 's Investor Services, in the 1995 budget the 
federal government announced that as o f 1 A p r i l 
1996 it was ending its shared-cost welfare and 
social assistance programs. Instead it would 
introduce a block fund called the Canada Social 
Transfer (renamed the Canada Health and Social 
Transfer in the legislation or C H S T ) which would 
ro l l together existing block funding for Medicare 
and post-secondary education {Established 
Programs Financing or E P F ) with welfare and 
social programs. The government also announced 
cuts to provincial transfers o f $2.5 bi l l ion in 
1996-97 and $4.5 bi l l ion in 1997-98, on top o f 
$1.5 bi l l ion announced in the 1994 budget. It was 
estimated that federal funding would decline from 
about $30 b i l l ion in spending on C A P and E P F to 
about $27 b i l l ion for the first year o f the C H S T 
(1996-97) and $25 bi l l ion for the second (National 
Counc i l o f Welfare, 1995:10). 
The creation o f the C H S T brings to an 
end the federal conditional grants set up under 
E P F and C A P . The C H S T is a block transfer: al l 
monies w i l l go to provincial Consolidated 
Revenue Funds. The monies are not earmarked. 
This therefore ends federal restrictions on the way 
money is spent on specific programs, with two 
exceptions. The provinces cannot impose a certain 
residence period as a condition for receiving 
assistance. I f they do, al l or part o f the cash 
portion o f the new C H S T could be withheld. 
Second, a l l the provisions o f the Canada Health 
Act, 1984 w i l l continue to apply, including 
providing "universal comprehensive, accessible, 
portable, and publicly-administered" programs 
(National Counc i l o f Welfare, 1995: 9-10). 
However, other conditions that used to 
exist under the C A P no longer apply. In order for 
provinces to receive federal funding, all people 
who could prove to be in need had to be eligible 
for financial assistance; the level o f financial 
assistance granted had to take into account the 
individual's budgetary requirements; a l l 
individuals had the right to appeal decisions 
denying financial assistance; and no individual 
could be forced to work in order to receive 
assistance (Jackman, 1995). None o f these 
provisions remain. 
The funding mechanism under the C H S T 
has changed as wel l . Under C A P , federal spending 
occurred only after the provinces had incurred a 
cost for a particular benefit. The C H S T , in 
contrast, is a controlled expenditure program so it 
no longer guarantees a 50/50 cost-shared 
arrangement on assistance programs to all 
provinces, but rather pays out funds as the old E P F 
program did. Federal contributions are paid in cash 
and tax points, calculated according to a very 
complex formula and granted as a block fund. A s a 
result o f the decreased funding, al l provinces are 
demanding greater flexibility in dealing with their 
spending. 
Provincial funding for health care and 
less so for education w i l l probably remain a 
priority for the provinces, which means that 
savings w i l l be made in the area o f welfare. 
Welfare costs, unlike health and post-secondary 
education costs, vary from year to year, and are 
counter-cyclical expenditures; that is, they are 
inversely related to the strength o f the economy. 
The C H S T funding formula w i l l be calculated 
based on economic growth, which is precisely w h y 
it is a poor determinant for spending on welfare. 
There w i l l therefore l ikely be a significant loss o f 
funding for welfare and social services under the 
C H S T compared to C A P (National Counc i l o f 
Welfare, 1995: 13-16). 
A s a result, we are already seeing 
reductions to welfare, rather than in other areas. 
The Saskatchewan government in February 1996 
announced proposed changes in welfare benefits 
including work for welfare requirements for young 
people. The Manitoba government, in M a r c h 
1996, simply slashed welfare benefits for single 
employable people (Roberts, 1996a, 1996b). The 
Ontario government introduced mandatory 
workfare in June 1996. These moves seem 
designed to get people off the welfare rolls as a 
way o f dealing with funding cutbacks. The 
Mani toba Fami ly Services Minis ter , Bonnie 
Mitchelson, even declared that the welfare 
reductions were implemented due to reductions in 
federal transfers (Roberts, 1996b). 
Under C A P provisions, such moves 
would have been open to challenge. Under the 
C H S T , however, the only condition still in place is 
the prohibition against imposing a residency 
period as a condition o f eligibil i ty for social 
assistance. One chi l l ing example o f the k i n d o f 
provincial/federal struggles that this leads to, and 
the effects on women and women's rights, is the 
fight over funding o f semi-private clinics in 
Alberta. In January 1995, the federal Health 
Minister, Diane Marleau, ordered Alberta and 
other provinces who allowed clinics to charge 
facility fees, to stop the practice by 15 October, 
arguing that the facility fees were a violation o f 
the Canada Health Act. The Alberta government 
resisted pressure to eliminate the facility fees, 
accepting a loss o f about $400,000 per month in 
transfer payments from October 1995 to M a y 
1996 to fight the federal government (Laghi , 
1996). It went so far as to threaten to stop funding 
abortions that were not deemed by doctors to be 
"medically necessary" (Canadian Press, 1995; 
Mclnnes , 1995a; Mi tche l l , 1995a, 1995b). 
That move, although coming from 
pressure from pro-lifers within the Conservative 
caucus, was also clearly designed on the part o f the 
Alberta government to assert its control over 
health care funding. 
2) The problem of Quebec 
The federal government's continued role 
in social programs is also in question given the 
continued demands on the part o f federalists in 
Quebec to completely vacate the field o f social 
policy. The federal government has had to respond 
to these demands, especially in light o f the 
near-success o f sovereigntists in the 1995 
referendum. Quebec federalists have long argued 
for greater provincial control over social programs 
as they feel the province can better provide 
services and respond to cultural concerns. 
A s a means to moll ify Quebec 
nationalists, the federal government is moving 
away from the use o f the federal spending power, 
its ch ief instrument in the area o f social policy. 
Some have speculated that the establishment o f 
the C H S T block funding is to demonstrate the 
f lexibi l i ty o f federalism. 8 The 1996 speech from 
the Throne, as part o f its strategy regarding 
Quebec, announced that the government " w i l l not 
use its spending power to create new shared-cost 
programs in areas o f exclusive provincial 
jurisdict ion without the consent o f a majority o f 
the provinces." It further stated that "any new 
program w i l l be designed so that non-participating 
provinces w i l l be compensated, provided they 
establish equivalent or comparable initiatives" 
(Canada, House o f Commons, 1996: 4). That is, 
provinces that do not want to participate can 
opt-out with fiscal compensation. 
The provinces are trying to push the 
federal government further. They do not want the 
federal government to be collecting the money and 
then giving it to them, even unconditionally. 
Some want the federal government to leave the 
field entirely and give provinces the tax points, 
which are worth more because they fluctuate more 
than a straight cash amount. Clearly the era o f 
cooperative federalism that led to the creation o f 
national social programs has ended. What should 
come in its place? 
T H E P R O V I N C E S ' P R O P O S A L S 
The radical decentralists propose that i f 
the federal government no longer provides 
adequate funding for social programmes, then it 
should vacate the field entirely. Some premiers 
argue that national standards could be set by the 
provinces and need not be dictated by the federal 
government, a suggestion designed to replace 
cooperative federalism and federal government 
"policing" with "executive interprovincialism." 
H o w w i l l executive interprovincialism 
work in practice? Contrary to some o f the 
premiers' assertions (Greenspon, 1996), it would 
appear that the provinces have not proven capable 
o f maintaining national standards, particularly in 
the area o f welfare. Instead, we are seeing different 
rules in place in different provinces, a competition 
between provinces to reduce welfare rolls, and a 
movement away from standards that once were 
deemed acceptable. A number o f provinces are 
engaged in the rollback o f welfare benefits, to the 
detriment o f claimants (Gadd, 1997). A n d , despite 
the assertions o f the Quebec government that it 
would maintain higher levels o f social programs, 
the Quebec government's willingness to spend 
money on social programs is as dependent on 
resources and the leader in power as other 
provinces, as demonstrated in the M a y 1996 
budget. Further, we should observe that an 
ideological impetus often underlies the cutbacks 
(Brodie, 1995). 
The question also arises o f how new 
national social programs to help women and 
children, such as chi ld care, could emerge under 
executive interprovincialism. C h i l d care activists 
knew after the 1995 budget and the announcement 
o f the C H S T that the vision o f a national chi ld care 
program was doomed, as the C H S T meant the 
federal government could no longer dictate on 
what the provinces spend the money. More than 
ever, new social programs require the political w i l l 
o f the provinces. Can we believe the provinces, 
under executive interprovincialism, w i l l be 
capable o f providing new services, or even 
maintaining services already in place? 
The answer is, obviously they cannot. 
Despite the fact that the provinces had the ability 
to expand programs such as child care under C A P 
wi th guaranteed matching funds from the federal 
government, and al l but Ontario, Alberta and B . C . 
were still guaranteed matching funds from Ottawa 
after 1990, none chose to develop a 
comprehensive chi ld care program. What 
executive interprovincialism seems designed to do, 
rather, is give the provinces the option to choose 
which services to offer, which services they deem 
necessary (and morally palatable), and not to 
develop new programs and much-needed services 
like ch i ld care. 
M a n y point to the example o f 
Saskatchewan and its experimentation in health 
care provision before there was a national health 
care program as an example of how the provinces 
can be social program innovators. But in order for 
provinces to be able to continue to "experiment" 
wi th the delivery o f new social programs, they 
would need the mechanisms the federal 
government has at its disposal to raise revenues: 
fiscal policy, and in particular, taxation power. 
Provinces do not have the fiscal levers necessary 
to greatly expand social programs. Thus we w i l l 
require an even more radical devolution of 
taxation power i f we go the route of full provincial 
control over social programs. 9 
Can provincial governments be trusted to 
ensure national standards? They really have no 
incentive to do so because they answer only to 
their provincial constituents, not to those in other 
provinces. A n d one province cannot interfere with 
what goes on in another province. Under executive 
interprovincialism, what means could be used to 
prevent the provinces from totally exiting social 
program provision? The idea of executive 
interprovincialism is based on relations among 
equal partners. How then can one province force 
another to adhere to a certain set o f standards? 
(Gibbins, 1996: 10) 
In fact, it would be in the provinces' 
interest to reduce programs as much as possible, 
insofar is it does not provoke an electoral outcry. 
A n d provinces could target those who are least 
able to speak out. In fact, it would be 
advantageous to abandon the social field first in 
order to compete wi th other provinces (Howse, 
1996: 11). 
A R E C O N C E P T U A L I Z A T I O N O F T H E 
D E B A T E 
In the past, there has been a happy 
coincidence o f the federal government being 
ideologically committed to and financially wi l l i ng 
to expand social programs. The one advantage o f 
having two levels o f government involved in the 
funding and regulation o f social programs is that 
one level—currently the federal government—can 
act as an enforcer o f standards when another level 
refuses to adhere to national standards or 
regulations. However, inasmuch as the federal 
government has played this role, it may not much 
longer. If federalism fails or has failed to provide 
the mechanism to sustain standards and levels o f 
benefits in social programs, we must find another 
mechanism to ensure social programs continue in 
this country, regardless o f where one lives, or what 
the ideological bent o f the current government is. 
For those o f us who believe Canada is a social as 
well as an economic union, we must enter and 
reclaim the debate about social programs on behalf 
o f citizenship. If citizenship rights are no longer 
being protected through the mechanism o f the 
federal spending power, then we need to introduce 
a new mechanism. Furthermore, since national 
governments themselves no longer have levers at 
their disposal to regulate social programs, rather 
than leaving it up to the provinces to police each 
other, a new regulatory actor is needed. I f not the 
national government, and not the provinces, 
whom? 
Some would suggest the courts. Even i f 
we accept the principle that social policy is a 
provincial responsibility, the way the issue should 
be framed is not over national standards but over 
rights o f citizenship. One could read the Charter as 
conferring rights to benefits from government as 
w e l l as protection from government, or for 
protection of the basic necessities o f life. The court 
route may be a way o f ensuring governments 
provide a certain minimum level o f economic or 
welfare benefits to individuals . 
M a n y point to clauses already existing in 
the Charter that could be used to argue for a social 
basis to citizenship (Howse, 1996; Jackman 1988, 
1993, 1994, 1995). Clearly section 6 o f the Charter 
protects mobil i ty rights and can be used to fight 
the imposition o f residency requirements. Other 
possible clauses are section 7, wh ich guarantees a 
right to life, liberty and security o f the person; 
section 15(1) which could be read to include the 
poor as deserving of equal protection and equal 
benefit o f the law without discrimination; section 
15 (2) which allows governments to enact 
affirmative action programs for disadvantaged 
people; and even section 36 o f the Constitution 
A c t , 1982, which articulates a commitment on the 
part o f governments to "(a) promote equal 
opportunities for the well-being o f Canadians; (b) 
furthering economic development to reduce 
disparities in opportunities; and (c) providing 
essential public services o f reasonable quality to 
a l l Canadians." It may be possible to interpret the 
equalization principle as equalization for al l 
individuals within Canada. 
Four single mothers in Ontario attempted 
to use the Charter to challenge the Ontario's 
government's reversion to the "spouse in the 
house" rule which the Conservative government 
implemented in 1995, in a case called Falkner v. 
Ontario (Geller and Jaffer, 1996). The rule, passed 
as part o f the General Welfare and Family Benefits 
Regulations, mandates that couples are to be 
immediately considered spouses and therefore be 
ineligible for welfare as singles or as sole support 
parents. The legislation, the lawyers argued in the 
court challenge, targets the poor as it forces them 
to become instant spouses and apply for welfare 
together. Before this law was enacted, couples 
were entitled to live common law for three years 
before being held responsible to provide financial 
support to the other or to the other's children. The 
women challenging this law argued it was an 
invasion o f their privacy under the Charter. 
Women are seen as targeted under the rule as the 
vast majority who lost benefits since October 
1995, when the new rule came into effect, were 
w o m e n . 1 0 
The four women lost their challenge o f 
the Ontario legislation at the Ontario court level, 
Canadian Press, 1996b). Given the ad hoc and 
slow nature o f the court process, it cannot be the 
only option. A n d it is less o f an option because o f 
the limited reading o f positive, or social rights 
given by judges under the Charter. 
The failings o f the Charter as an 
instrument for enforcing positive rights points to 
the need for something like a citizens' Social 
Charter that is justiciable (Bakan and 
Schneiderman, 1992; Echenberg et. al . , 1992). 
Such a development is not l ikely, however, as it 
would involve a constitutional amendment even 
beyond what was attempted in the Charlottetown 
Accord . There is little l ikelihood o f any 
constitutional changes of that scale to be attempted 
in Canada in the foreseeable future. 
A T H I R D W A Y 
With what does that leave us? This paper 
has argued that social services should be seen as 
an issue o f citizenship, not solely o f federalism. It 
proposes, then, making the people who are 
consumers of the programs the enforcers o f 
standards. After al l , provinces, or provincial 
leaders are not the most representative o f public 
opinion. Let us also not forget the people engaged 
in discussion on the future o f social programs are 
the same band who brought us the Meech Lake 
and the Charlottetown Accords, and were judged 
by the population to be unrepresentative of the 
citizens o f Canada." H o w much less are they 
unrepresentative as the consumers o f the services? 
M a n y people refer to the subsidiarity 
principle guiding European Un ion social pol icy 
under the Maastrict Treaty as an example for 
Canada to follow (Courchene, 1996a, 1996b). The 
principle o f subsidiarity is that "both the 
undertaking o f political decisions and the 
implementation o f their effects should, in the 
interests o f democracy and justice, be performed at 
that level o f government which is most immediate 
to the people whom those decisions affect, only 
being transferred to a higher level in the interests 
o f efficiency" (Green, 1994: 290). 
Subsidiarity is an attractive doctrine for 
those who feel a higher level o f authority should 
only be given responsibility for matters with which 
lower levels o f authority can no longer deal. But 
we should look at how subsidiarity works in 
practice in countries which support the principle. 
In Germany, for example, administration of the 
health care system, pensions, accident insurance, 
child support, welfare, and so on, is not carried out 
by the national government, nor by the state 
governments, but rather by about 1,800 social 
security and health funds. The governing boards o f 
these funds are made up o f representatives o f 
business, professional and labour interests, the 
"social partners." The officials o f the funds are 
elected by their members. These funds have 
power, for example, to set fee structures for 
physicians, the investment o f pension funds, and 
the construction and management of hospitals 
(Conradt, 1996: 230). 
In other words, even the German Lander 
are not considered small enough groupings for the 
administration o f these programs. The German 
model might suggest the new actors that can 
emerge to have decision-making authority in the 
area o f social programs. In Europe, positive 
collective rights are enforced by parties, as wel l as 
trade unions and employers' associations. Room 
must be made in Canada for these new actors, the 
provinces and federal government becoming then 
just one o f a number o f state actors. 
Jackman (1995: 403-4) recommends that 
because women have distinct needs and particular 
disadvantages, governments should increase 
opportunities for women to be involved in the 
design o f welfare programs and that these 
programs should be accountable to women who 
use them. She recommends this could be enforced 
legislatively, by adding a clause to the 
Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements A c t which 
governs the C H S T that the provinces recognize 
"the need to increase opportunities for women to 
participate in welfare design and reform, and the 
need to make programs and services more 
accountable to the women who use them" (404). 
Beyond such legislative changes, though, 
governments would have to implement structures 
to solicit participation on the part o f affected 
groups like women and to ensure accountability o f 
these programs to these groups. Perhaps it is time 
for some truly corporatist 1 2 structures in Canada, 
bringing in representatives from groups directly 
affected by changes in welfare programs. A more 
corporatist form o f feminism, as Mahon points out, 
would work within the representational system that 
l inks organizations in society to the state, such as 
is seen in Sweden. In Sweden, women's 
committees choose to work within the party and 
thus are a lot more influential when that party is in 
government. In Canada, this lack o f "insider" l inks 
characterizes women's groups like the National 
Ac t ion Committee on the Status o f Women 
(Mahon, 1996) and weakens women's voices in the 
design and planning of social programs. This 
move, to involve affected interests in the planning 
and implementation o f social pol icy as we l l as the 
scrutiny o f programs, would not a require 
constitutional amendment. It would simply require 
the introduction o f new institutional arrangements 
truly based on "social partnerships." 
C O N C L U S I O N 
A s this article demonstrates, arguments 
for radical decentralization not only have 
implications in terms of federalism and national 
unity, but also the federal-provincial fight for 
control over social policy. Thus, decentralization 
has enormous implications for the kinds o f policies 
and programs that w i l l remain in place to help 
people in need in Canada. 
This article has suggested that social 
pol icy must no longer be conceived as solely an 
issue o f federalism. The debate over social 
programs must be moved out o f its territorial 
focus. Provinces are rapidly becoming the most 
powerful actors in the area of social pol icy in 
Canada; we should question whether we want 
them to be. This paper suggests the alternative is 
not solely the federal government, however. 
Clearly government involvement is still required at 
the federal and provincial levels to negotiate 
funding for programs. But the actors involved 
must expand beyond those representing regional 
interests alone to include those most affected by 
the programs: the beneficiaries o f these programs. 
Federalism is not simply a system o f rules 
proscribing or prescribing actions between actors. 
Federalism is also an institution embodying 
structured relations between actors. If federalism is 
crumbling, what needs to be replaced are not the 
rules but the institutional actors. 
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